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Abstract
The standard economic theory of crime deterrence predicts that the
conviction of an innocent (type-I error) is as detrimental to deterrence
as the acquittal of a guilty individual (type-II error). In this paper,
we qualify this result theoretically, showing that in the presence of risk
aversion, loss-aversion, or di￿erential sensitivity to procedural fairness,
type-I errors can have a larger e￿ect on deterrence than type-II errors.
We test these predictions with an experiment where participants make
a decision on whether to steal from other individuals, being subject
to di￿erent probabilities of judicial errors. The results indicate that
both types of judicial errors have a large and signi￿cant impact on
deterrence, but these e￿ects are not symmetric. An increase in the
probability of type-I errors has a larger negative impact on deterrence
than an equivalent increase in the probability of type-II errors. This
asymmetry is largely explained by risk aversion and, to a lesser extent,
type-I error aversion.
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condamnØ est l’a￿aire de tous les honnŒtes gens.￿1
(Jean de La BruyŁre, Les CaractŁres, 1692)
￿The prospect of innocents languishing in prison or, worse, being
put to death for crimes that they did not commit, should be intol-
erable to every American, regardless of race, politics, sex, origin,
or creed.￿
(The Innocence Project, 2008)2
1 Introduction
It is common wisdom to consider the punishment of an innocent more ques-
tionable than the acquittal of a guilty individual. As honnŒtes gens ￿ in the
words of de La BruyŁre ￿ we share the same opinion. As economists, however,
we must recognize that the support for this view is less clear-cut. In fact,
the standard economic theory of public enforcement of law suggests that the
conviction of an innocent (type-I error) is no worse than the acquittal of a
guilty individual (type-II error), since both types of errors jeopardize deter-
rence by the same token (see for instance Polinsky and Shavell, 2007). The
implication of this results is straightforward: if optimal deterrence is what
matters, the policy-maker ￿ and the judge ￿ should be indi￿erent between
one additional type-I error and one additional type-II error.
The economic model of crime deterrence, originally developed by Becker
(1968), was extended by Harris (1970) to include the e￿ect of type-I errors.
Png (1986) modelled explicitly the e￿ect of both types of judicial errors on
deterrence: a higher probability of type-I errors decreases the expected payo￿
of abiding by the law, whereas a higher probability of type-II errors increases
the payo￿ of engaging in the unlawful activity. Thereafter, this extension has
been generally incorporated in the economic literature on crime deterrence
(see e.g. Kaplow, 1994; Garoupa, 1997; Polinsky and Shavell, 2008). Within
this framework, the e￿ects of judicial errors on deterrence are expected to be
symmetric, since the probabilities of type-I and type-II errors have the same
impact on the di￿erence between the returns from honesty and from crime.
1A guilty man punished is an example for the rabble; an innocent man condemned is a
matter for all honest people.
2The Innocence Project is a non-pro￿t, national litigation and public policy organi-
zation dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted people through DNA testing and
reforming the criminal justice system to prevent future injustice. Through the years the
project has managed to obtain the exoneration of 225 people that received a ￿nal sentence;
17 of which were on the death row. The quotation is from the Innocence Project website,
http://www.innocenceproject.org.
2This theoretical account of the relationship between judicial errors and
crime deterrence has been the object of several criticisms. Ehrlich (1982)
observes that the conviction of an innocent may increase deterrence if it is
perceived by other imperfectly informed would-be o￿enders as the conviction
of a guilty individual. They may misinterpret an increase of type-I errors as
a decrease of type-II errors, and can therefore be more strongly deterred
from committing crimes. Strandburg (2003) notices how the two types of
judicial errors are inextricably linked together, as the production of both de-
pends on the same enforcement strategy by the authority. Depending on the
strategy implemented, an increase in accuracy, represented by a reduction
of the sum of the two errors (Kaplow, 1996), may result in either higher or
lower deterrence.3 Kaplow and Shavell (1994) point out how judicial errors
generally discourage participation in socially desirable activities. This e￿ect
becomes stronger when risk-aversion is also considered (Block and Sidak,
1980).4 More recently, the Png (1986) indi￿erence result has been ques-
tioned by Lando (2006), who argues that when mistakes about the identity
of the criminal are taken into account,5 type-I errors have no detrimental ef-
fect on deterrence (see Garoupa and Rizzolli, 2009, for a critique of Lando’s
argument). Fon and Schaefer (2007) show that the negative e￿ect of type-I
errors on deterrence can be partially o￿set by state liability against wrongful
convictions.
At the empirical level, several experimental analyses have examined the
deterrence hypothesis,6 although only relatively few are based on a setting
that convincingly reproduces crime in the lab. Falk and Fischbacher (2002)
examine how social interaction a￿ects the propensity to commit a crime.
Visser et al. (2006) explore the deterrence hypothesis experimentally using a
reverse dictator game. Subjects are randomly paired and must decide how
much to steal from their counterpart’s endowment, having been informed of
the exogenously determined probability of type-II error. By varying both
the potential amount to be stolen and the probability of detection, the au-
thors study whether the decisions to steal satisfy the Generalized Axiom of
Revealed Preference (GARP).7 Hoerisch and Strassmair (2008) conduct an
3The nuisance e￿ect of errors on the perception of the rule in place has also been noticed
by Craswell and Calfee (1986).
4See Immordino and Polo (2008) for an analysis of the e￿ect of judicial errors on the
innovative activity of ￿rms.
5Mistakes of identity are those for which, in the presence of evident crimes such as
murders and robberies, the wrong person is incriminated. Mistakes of act occur instead
when someone is convicted for crimes that did not happen.
6Monitoring and sanctioning sco￿aw behavior is routinely part of experiments in per-
sonnel economics, such as Backes-Gellner et al. (2008) and Falk and G￿chter (2008). See
also Schulze and Frank (2003); Abbink (2006) on the analysis of corruption, Torgler (2002)
on tax compliance, and Fehr and Gachter (2000) on public good experiments.
7The authors also estimate demand functions for stolen loot and the corresponding
elasticities for criminal participation and the amount of money stolen with respect to the
terms of trade between money stolen and the probability of detection, and between money
3experiment on crime deterrence using a similar reverse dictator game. They
examine whether observed decisions to steal are compatible with alternative
theories of social preferences, ￿nding that the deterrence hypothesis poorly
describes the observed behavior. When there is little or no probability of
detection, so that the incentives for theft are high, subjects steal less than
when the expected sanction is more signi￿cant (however, when the sanction
becomes severe, the deterrence hypothesis holds). They conclude that the
threat of a sanction may crowd out law-abiding behavior.8
Judicial errors are an important issue for public policy. They are par-
ticularly relevant, although not exclusively, for the enforcement of adminis-
trative and criminal law. Quite surprisingly, however, the economic theory
of optimal deterrence has so far paid relatively little attention to the e￿ects
of judicial errors. At the empirical level, most of the existing experimental
work considers only the case where criminal behavior goes unpunished (type-
II error), whereas there is hardly any evidence on the case where law-abiding
behavior is erroneously sanctioned (type-I error).
In this paper, we build on the theory of optimal deterrence to show that
there are several economic arguments that may explain asymmetric e￿ects
of type-I and type-II errors on deterrence. First, the Png (1986) equivalence
result is not robust to departures from risk-neutrality. By simply introducing
risk-aversion in the standard model of public enforcement, it can be shown
that type-I errors are more detrimental to deterrence than type-II errors.
Second, the introduction of loss-aversion reinforces this result, so that a given
increase in the probability of type-I errors, compensated by an equivalent
decrease in the probability of type-II errors, induces more people to commit
the crime. Third, we propose a further behavioral element that can explain
di￿erences in responses to the two type of errors: a di￿erential sensitivity to
procedural fairness that results in what we refer to as type-I error aversion:
being punished when one has abided by the law implies a speci￿c cost in
terms of loss of guidance and motivational crowding-out.
We then provide empirical evidence on these theoretical hypotheses by
means of an appropriately designed laboratory experiment. The main objec-
tive of the analysis is to test the deterrence hypothesis, focusing on the role of
type-I errors, and to assess whether type-I and type-II errors have the same
impact on deterrence. Our ￿ndings indicate that both types of judicial errors
have a large and signi￿cant impact on deterrence. However, contrary to the
predictions of the standard theory of crime deterrence, type-I and type-II
errors do not have symmetric e￿ects. An increase in the probability of type-I
errors is found to have a larger negative impact on deterrence than the same
increase in the probability of type-II errors. This asymmetry is largely ex-
plained by the e￿ect of risk aversion and, to a lesser extent, sensitivity to
stolen and the sanction.
8See also Sonnemans and van Dijk (2008) for an analysis of the role of judicial errors
from the judge’s viewpoint.
4procedural fairness, whereas loss aversion does not play a signi￿cant role.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide the theoretical
framework. Building on the standard theory of crime deterrence, we focus on
the role of type-I errors and extend the model to account for risk attitudes,
loss aversion and sensitivity to procedural fairness. Section 3 describes the
experimental design. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes with
a discussion of the main ￿ndings and the implications of the analysis.
2 Theory
The basic model of crime deterrence envisages an individual that must decide
whether to commit a crime. His ex-ante wealth is w0 and a successful crime
makes him gain g. The adjudicative authority monitors the criminal activity
and pursues the case if it detects it.9 The authority must convince the judge
that the individual deserves a conviction. The adjudication is prone to two
types of judicial errors: innocent individuals mistakenly judged guilty (type-I
errors) and guilty individuals mistakenly judged innocent (type-II errors).
Defendants’ ability to confute the charges of the prosecutor derives from
factors that are either dependent on their actual innocence (such as the ability
to produce exculpatory evidence) or independent of it (such as wealth and the
possibility to a￿ord good lawyers). The probability of successfully confuting
the prosecutor’s allegations is a function of the frequency distribution of these
di￿erential abilities. There are therefore two distributions for the probability
of the accused to successfully defend oneself, one for guilty individuals and
one for innocent individuals, as described in Figure 1. The null hypothesis
is that the accused subject is innocent. The prosecutor submits his charges
to the court seeking to convince the judge to refute the null hypothesis.
The defendant confutes the prosecutor’s charges in order to support the null
hypothesis. Let X be the ability of the defendant to confute the prosecutor’s
allegations. We assume that, on average, innocent individuals have a high X
while guilty individuals have a low X, but the two distributions overlap.
Suppose that, in a given procedure, the required burden of proof to con-
vict is low. This means that the prosecutor can easily convince the judge
to reject the null and, conversely, the defendant must have a high ability
(ah) to defend himself if he wants to be acquitted. Notice that, to the left
of ah there will be a fraction of innocent individuals who will not be able
to successfully defend themselves and will be wrongfully convicted, so that
the probability of type-I error is "1. Conversely, to the right of ah there will
be a fraction of guilty individuals who are able to prove their innocence,
so that the probability of type-II error is "2. If the standard of evidence
is increased, for instance, from ￿preponderance of evidence￿to ￿beyond any
9For simplicity, we do not distinguish between the enforcement authority, such as the
police, in charge of detecting the crime, and the adjudicative authority itself, such as the
court, that decides wether the evidence collected is su￿cient to reach a conviction.
5Figure 1: Frequency distributions of the authority’s ability to prove guilt
Note: The ￿gure is adapted from Feinberg (1971)
reasonable doubt￿, the ability required to prove one’s own innocence falls to
al. This results in higher "2 and lower "1.10
Let us go back to the choice between committing the crime (C) or being
innocent (I). The individual knows that, if he decides to commit the crime,
he faces a probability "2 of successfully escaping the conviction. Conversely,
if he does not commit the crime, he faces a probability "1 of being convicted
even if innocent. If convicted, he faces a ￿xed sanction f, that represents the
magnitude of the ￿ne or the private costs of the prison term.
First, assume risk neutrality. In order to decide whether to commit the
crime, each individual assesses the net bene￿ts of crime (the gains g minus
the expected costs of committing the crime) against the expected costs of
staying honest (positive because of type-I errors). The expected costs of
crime are determined by the magnitude of the ￿ne and/or the costs of the
sanction (f), and by the probability of being eventually convicted (1 ¡ "2).
The costs of staying honest are determined by "1 and f. The expected payo￿s
in the two cases are:
10From basic decision theory, it is well known that a decision rule prescribing the re-
jection of the less probable hypothesis minimizes expected error. Therefore, for a given
technology of fact-￿nding, accuracy (which is measured with the sum of the two errors)
is maximized when the standard of proof is set at the ￿preponderance of evidence￿ level
(Demougin and Fluet, 2005). In Figure 1 this is obtained at ah: Accuracy can also improve
if the technology of fact ￿nding improves. In this way both types of errors simultaneously
decrease and thus the judge can better discriminate between innocence and guilt (Kaplow,
1994; Kaplow and Shavell, 1994). In Figure 1 this would result in the two distributions
being less dispersed around the mean and thus having a smaller overlapping region.
6(
E¼I = "1(w0 ¡ f) + (1 ¡ "1)w0
E¼C = "2(w0 + g) + (1 ¡ "2)(w0 + g ¡ f)
(1)
The individual will not commit the crime if the expected payo￿ from the
criminal activity does not exceed the expected payo￿ from innocence, that





1 ¡ "1 ¡ "2
(2)
Notice from equation (2) that "1 and "2 have the same impact on deter-
rence. On the one hand, type-II errors undermine deterrence as they decrease
the probability of being convicted for guilty individuals. On the other hand,
type-I errors increase the costs of staying honest and thus decrease the rel-
ative costs of committing the crime. At the margin, one further innocent
convicted is equivalent to one further guilty acquitted (Png, 1986).11
Proposition 1. If individuals are risk-neutral, type-I and type-II errors are
equally detrimental to deterrence.
2.1 Risk aversion
In the presence of risk aversion, type-I errors are more detrimental to deter-
rence than type-II errors. Assuming a concave utility function, the expected
utility from crime and innocence can be written as follows:
(
EUI = "1U(w0 ¡ f) + (1 ¡ "1)U(w0)
EUC = "2U(w0 + g) + (1 ¡ "2)U(w0 + g ¡ f)
(3)
A rational individual will be deterred from committing the crime if EUI >
EUC, that is if
U(w0) ¡ U(w0 + g ¡ f) ¡ "1[U(w0) ¡ U(w0 ¡ f)]
¡ "2[U(w0 + g) ¡ U(w0 + g ¡ f)] > 0 (4)
Figure 2 shows how both "1 and "2 negatively a￿ect deterrence, as in the
case of risk neutrality. However, given the concavity of the utility function,
the negative impact of type-I errors on expected utility is larger. To see why,
notice that the concavity of the utility function implies that U(w0)¡U(w0¡
f) > U(w0 +g)¡U(w0 +g ¡f). Therefore "1 has a relatively larger adverse
impact on deterrence than "2. Put it in a di￿erent way, in order to maintain
the same level of deterrence, a given increase in "1 must be compensated by
a larger decrease in "2.
11The standard analysis of optimal deterrence extended to include type-I errors usually
considers only the risk-neutral case (see for instance Polinsky and Shavell (2007), section
15).
7Proposition 2. In the presence of risk aversion, type-I errors are more
detrimental to deterrence than type-II errors
Figure 2: Expected utility for a risk-averse individual
Note: The ￿gure displays the expected utilities EUI and EUC as a function of "1 and
"2, respectively.
2.2 Loss aversion
The expected utility framework has failed to account for a large body of ex-
perimental evidence (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman et al., 1990). In addition,
several phenomena observed in experimental settings, consistent with risk-
aversion, cannot be explained by decreasing marginal returns of wealth, but
are likely to be due to other factors(Rabin, 2000; Rabin and Thaler, 2001).
One of the main violations of the expected utility framework is loss aversion
(Kahneman et al., 1991). Loss aversion derives from the fact that people
are often framed to think of possible outcomes relative to a certain reference
point, rather than as an absolute outcome. This may explain the observed
tendency for people to prefer the avoidance of losses (outcomes below the
reference point) than the acquisition of comparable gains (outcomes above
the reference point). Cumulative prospect theory accounts for loss aversion
and also for other behavioral regularities, such as the tendency to overweight
extreme, but unlikely events, and the re￿ection e￿ect (Bowles, 2004).12 The
12Kahneman and Tversky (1979) observed that when decision problems involve not just
possible gains, but also possible losses, people’s preferences over negative prospects are
usually a mirror image of their preferences over positive prospects. While they are risk-
averse over prospects involving gains, people become risk-loving over prospects involving
losses. This observation is re￿ected in the convexity of the value function in the losses.
8reference-dependent value function typically used in prospect theory is de-
picted in Figure 3 (note that the reference is w0 and f > g.). It is reasonable
to assume that the reference point is centered on the status quo before crime
(w0). The function is kinked at the status quo with loss aversion coe￿cient
of about 2 or more.13
Figure 3: Reference-dependent value function and loss aversion
Note: Value function as envisaged by prospect theory (left) and comparison with
standard utility function (right).
Loss aversion is a behavioral concept that can be disentangled from both
probability weighting and the re￿ection e￿ect (they are typically combined in
the value function used in prospect theory). Indeed, most of the literature on
loss aversion employs standard utility to embody loss aversion (Schmidt and
Zank, 2005). In the right panel of Figure 3, we compare the utility function
with loss aversion and the reference point at w0 with the utility function
described above. Given the concavity of the curve and the kink at w0 we can
observe that
[UvN¡M(w0) ¡ UvN¡M(w0 ¡ f)] ¡ [U(w0 + g) ¡ UvN¡M(w0 + g ¡ f)]
< [ULA(w0) ¡ ULA(w0 ¡ f)] ¡ [ULA(w0 + g) ¡ ULA(w0 + g ¡ f)] (5)
Equation (5) indicates that loss aversion provides an additional reason, in
addition to risk aversion, for "1 to have a larger adverse impact on deterrence
than "2.
13This coe￿cient is usually measured as
¡U
0(¡1)
U0(1) . This implies that the utility function
immediately to the left of the reference point is at least twice as steep as to the right. For
other measures of loss aversion see K￿bberling and Wakker (2005).
9Proposition 3. In the presence of loss aversion, type-I errors are more
detrimental to deterrence than type-II errors.
2.3 Type-I error aversion
Economists tend to have an instrumental view of the law: the law is a set of
incentives that constrain individuals only as long as it is optimal for them to
abide. However, this approach is not commonly shared, and most law schol-
ars and philosophers emphasize the expressive function of rules:14 the law
prescribes a certain behavior and people tend to follow its precepts because
it is the ￿right thing to do￿, with little regard to the sanction that backs the
rule.
In this perspective, "1 and "2 have very di￿erent meanings. When a
wrongful acquittal occurs, the violation of the prescribed behavior is not
sanctioned, but at the same time the prescription is not questioned. Instead,
with a wrongful conviction, a certain behavior is ￿rst dictated and then rep-
rimanded, so that the prescription is neglected by the sanction. Therefore,
while type-II errors preserve the expressive function of the rule, as its vio-
lation is not sanctioned but the precept is unshaken, type-I errors disrupt
the expressive function of the rule, as punishing a law-abiding individual
necessarily neglects the precept.
We formulate the hypothesis that the disruption of this expressive func-
tion caused by type-I errors implies a speci￿c cost for the individual. Indi-
viduals are adverse to type-I errors because they impose an additional cost in
terms of loss of guidance and motivational crowding-out. As discussed above,
it is reasonable to assume that most people, most of the time, look at the
law as a set of guidance rules. Therefore, the possibility of being convicted
assumes a di￿erent connotation for the individual who lets the law guide his
behavior. Beyond the cost of punishment, the law-abiding individual also
pays the cost of the loss of guidance, since the law commands to do some-
thing and nevertheless punishes him. In addition, wrongful punishment can
crowd-out the intrinsic motivation to obey the law.
Let us assume that "1-averse agents not only bene￿t from material payo￿s,
but also su￿er from the occurrence of "1 errors, because of the loss of guidance
and the feeling of injustice they have been victim of. These agents have a
utility function that can be described as EUI ¡ ¸"1, where ¸ is a parameter
14For economic approaches to the expressive function of the law see Cooter (1998).
Indeed, not all economists have a Beckerian view of the law. To begin with, note that
many microeconomics textbooks, and generally many works in economics, assume agents
to optimize subject to the constrains of the law (see Nance, 1997, note 82, for some
examples). On the other hand, the assumption of unconstrained optimization has come
under increasing criticisms theoretically (see Harrison, 1986), empirically (e.g. Ellickson,
1991) and behaviorally (see Galbiati and Vertova, 2008, who show how the behavior of
agents in the laboratory changes following a change of command without any change in
the sanction).
10that captures the sensitivity to type-I errors. The utility for the crime choice
is instead modelled as before:
(
EUI = "1U(w0 ¡ f) + (1 ¡ "1)U(w0) ¡ ¸"1
EUC = "2U(w0 + g) + (1 ¡ "2)U(w0 + g ¡ f)
(6)
Individuals are therefore deterred if
U(w0) ¡ U(w0 + g ¡ f) ¡ "1[U(w0) ¡ U(w0 ¡ f) + ¸]
¡ "2[U(w0 + g) ¡ U(w0 + g ¡ f)] > 0 (7)
As shown in Figure 4, even without assuming concavity of the utility
function, type-I-error aversion implies that [U(w0)¡U(w0¡f)+¸] > [U(w0+
g) ¡ U(w0 + g ¡ f). As a consequence, "1 has a larger adverse impact on
deterrence than "2.
Proposition 4. In the presence of type-I-error aversion, type-I errors are
more detrimental to deterrence than type-II errors.
Figure 4: E￿ects of type-I error aversion
Note that, for those agents that do not commit the crime, the costs of "1
in terms of ￿injustice￿ or ￿lost guidance￿ add up to the costs of "1 in terms of
￿jeopardized deterrence￿. Conversely, agents opting for the crime do not bear
these costs. Therefore, when f = f¤, type-I-error aversion tips the balance
in favour of the criminal option since it crowds-out the incentives to abide by
the law. This e￿ect can be present in addition to the e￿ects of risk-aversion
and loss aversion discussed above.
113 Experimental design
This section presents the experimental design. We start by describing the
baseline game used to simulate crime in the lab. We then present the dif-
ferent treatments and the hypotheses to be tested. Finally, we describe the
experimental procedures.
3.1 Baseline game
The kind of crime mimicked in this experiment is petty larceny. The ex-
perimental task is based on a reverse dictator game, described in Figure 5.
Two agents, A and B, are randomly matched and assigned an initial endow-
ment (wA;wB). Agent A has to decide whether to subtract a sum g from
B’s endowment. If A decides to take g, there is a probability 1¡"2 that the
transfer is detected and, if this happens, A pays a sanction f (while keeping
the amount g). If A decides not to take, he will be (wrongfully) sanctioned
with probability "1. Note that A does not know the size of B’s endowment.
This allows us to abstract from issues related to distributional fairness or
inequality aversion.
Figure 5: Baseline game
This game has been relatively little studied so far in the experimental lit-
erature. In our setting, the decision in the reverse dictator game is not about
fairness or distribution, as subjects do not know other subjects’ endowment.
It is rather about the conformity to the social norm of not stealing, or not
committing a crime in general. In particular, with this baseline game we can
12test if and how type-I and type-II errors a￿ect the willingness to abide by
the social norm.
3.2 Treatments
Our experimental design is described in Table 1. The endowment of A is
set to wA = 10 in treatments T1 to T4. The endowment of B, unknown to
subjects A, is set to wB = 15 in all treatments. The amount that can be
stolen from B is set to g = 10 in all treatments. The key treatment variables
are the probabilities of type-I and type-II errors ("1, "2). They are both set
to 0 in the control treatment (T1), that provides a benchmark with optimal
deterrence. The probabilities of judicial errors are increased independently
in treatments T2 ("1 = 0, "2 = 0:5) and T3 ("1 = 0:5, "2 = 0:), respectively,
and jointly in treatment T4 ("1 = 0:25, "2 = 0:25). In treatments T5 and T6
we replicate treatments T2 and T3, while varying the endowment of subject
A (wA), in order to assess the role of risk aversion.
Figure 6 provides a visual comparison of expected utility across the six
treatments. Note that, as shown in Table 1, the expected gain from com-
mitting the crime is the same (E¼C ¡ E¼I = 5) in treatments T2 to T6.
Also note that, relative to the control treatment (T1) the di￿erence in the
expected utility obtained from crime and innocence (¢EU in Table 1) is the
same in treatments T3 ("1 = 0:5, "2 = 0:) and T5 ("1 = 0, "2 = 0:5). Like-
wise, the di￿erence in the expected utility obtained from crime and innocence
is the same in treatments T2 ("1 = 0, "2 = 0:5) and T6 ("1 = 0:5, "2 = 0:).
Table 1: Experimental design: comparison of treatments
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
"1 0 0 0.5 0.25 0 0.5
"2 0 0.5 0 0.25 0.5 0
wA 10 10 10 10 0 20
E¼I 10 10 5 7.5 0 15


























Note: "1 = probability of type-I error, "2 = probability of type-II error, wA =
endowment of subject A, E¼I = A’s expected payo￿ if innocent, E¼C = A’s expected
payo￿ if criminal, EUI = A’s expected utility if innocent, EUC = A’s expected utility if
criminal, ¢EU = Net expected utility gain from criminal activity.
This design presents some noteworthy advantages: it has a very simple
and intelligible structure; it mimics very intuitively a petty theft; it allows
us to disentangle the incentive e￿ect of adjudicative errors from other factors
13Figure 6: Comparison of treatments
that may a￿ect subjects’ behavior. In addition, the passivity of B removes
all strategic uncertainty from A’s choice.
We implement the six treatments using a within-subjects design, so that
in a session each subject plays the baseline game in 6 di￿erent versions,
corresponding to the 6 treatments described in Table 1. The experiment is
run in four sessions. Within each session, treatments T2,T3,T5 and T6 are
played twice, in a di￿erent sequence, in order to provide an assessment of
the robustness of the key treatment e￿ects. This implies that in each session
the reverse dictator game is played in 10 di￿erent phases, with a sequence
described in Table 2.
Table 2: Sequence of treatments within sessions
Phase 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Session 1 1 4 2 3 5 6 2 3 5 6
Session 2 4 1 3 2 6 5 3 2 6 5
Session 3 1 4 2 3 5 6 2 3 5 6
Session 4 4 1 3 2 6 5 3 2 6 5
Note: sessions 1-2=Crime Framing with Loss; session 3=Neutral Framing with Loss;
session 4=Neutral Framing with no Loss.
In order to assess the role of loss aversion and procedural fairness, we also
vary the framing of the game across sessions. In sessions 1 and 2 the game is
explained with a language that lets the subjects perceive that the sanction
is the punishment for a theft, and indicates wA as a reference point, so that
type-I errors should be perceived as losses (Punishment Framing with Loss).
14In session 3, we use a neutral framing for the sanction (Neutral Framing with
Loss). In session 4, in addition to neutral framing for the sanction, all payo￿s
are expressed as potential gains, thus not o￿ering a reference point that leads
to potential losses (Neutral Framing with no Loss).
3.3 Hypotheses
Let us de￿ne Zi as the fraction of agents that opt for crime in the population
in treatment i. The ￿rst question we address is the e￿ect of changes in the
probability of type-II errors on deterrence, examining what happens when,
ceteris paribus, the probability of detection for criminals is exogenously de-
creased (Becker’s deterrence hypothesis). This can be assessed by comparing
T1 with T2:
Hypothesis 1a - Crime should increase as the expected sanction
becomes suboptimal due to a rise in "2
H0 : ZT2 = ZT1 vs H1 : ZT2 > ZT1 (H1a)
The second hypothesis we test is based on the Png (1986) extension of
the deterrence hypothesis to type-I errors. We examine the e￿ect of type-I
errors on deterrence by comparing T3 with T1. When type-I errors increase,
the returns from being innocent decrease, so that Z is expected to rise:
Hypothesis 1b - Crime should increase as the expected sanction
becomes suboptimal due to a rise in "1
H0 : ZT3 = ZT1 vs H1 : ZT3 > ZT1 (H1b)
Third, we consider the e￿ect of a joint increase in both type-I and type-II
errors, by comparing T1 with T4 (Becker’s and Png’s deterrence hypothesis).
The sanction is suboptimal in T4 while it is optimal in T1:
Hypothesis 1c - Crime should increase as the expected sanction
becomes suboptimal due to a rise in both "1 and "2
H0 : ZT1 = ZT4 vs H1 : ZT4 > ZT1 (H1c)
The next question we address is whether type-I and type-II judicial errors
have the same impact on deterrence. The standard theory of crime deter-
rence, under risk neutrality, predicts that both errors are equally detrimental
to deterrence. We can test this hypothesis by comparing T2 with T3. These
two treatments di￿er only with respect to the probability of the two types
of judicial errors, while the expected gains from crime are the same in both
treatments:
15Hypothesis 2 - Crime should increase in the same way in re-
sponse to a given increase in "1 and "2:
H0 : ZT2 = ZT3 vs H1 : ZT2 < ZT3 (H2)
When comparing treatments T2 and T3, a di￿erence in the proportion
of criminals could be explained by a number of factors. A ￿rst explanation
could be linked to risk aversion. Although the expected net gains from crime
in the two treatments is the same, the wealth of the individual is not. This
implies that type-II errors could have a smaller e￿ect on deterrence than type-
I errors just because of diminishing marginal returns if the utility function
is concave. Second, if subjects are loss averse, the e￿ect of judicial errors on
deterrence can be asymmetric. In the case of type-I errors, the riskiness of
the uncertain outcome increases the loss of expected utility for an innocent.
In the case of type-II errors, the riskiness of the uncertain outcome reduces
the gain in expected utility for a criminal.15 As a consequence, for a given
expected sanction, in the presence of loss-aversion type-I errors should have
a larger negative e￿ect on deterrence than type-II errors. Third, the two
type of errors could be perceived di￿erently in terms of procedural fairness.
If type-I errors are perceived as less fair than type-II errors, this leads to a
higher incidence of crime despite an equal expected sanction.
We test for the e￿ect of risk attitudes by comparing T2 with T5 and
T3 with T6. In the presence of risk aversion, we expect the e￿ect of a
0.5 increase in "2 to be stronger in T5, where wA = 0, than in T2, where
wA = 10. Similarly, risk aversion implies that the e￿ect of a 0.5 increase in
"1 is stronger in T3, where wA = 10, than in T6, where wA = 20. These
exogenous changes in wA allow us to compare the e￿ects of type-I and type-
II errors while controlling for risk attitudes. We thus compare T2 with T6
and T3 with T5. Note that there is the same di￿erence in expected utility
between honesty and crime within each pair of treatments (see Figure 6).
Therefore, in both cases, the e￿ect of "1 and "2 on deterrence should be the
same, irrespective of attitudes towards risk, as the di￿erence in expected
utility is the same in both treatments.
Hypothesis 3 - Controlling for the e￿ect of attitudes towards
risk, crime should increase in the same way in response to a given
increase in "1 or "2.
We thus test whether type-I and type-II errors have the same e￿ect on
deterrence, while controlling for risk attitudes, setting our null hypotheses as
follows:
15Of course if f > g there could potentially be some losses in case of crime as well.
However, while with "1 > 0 the innocent surely bears an expected loss, with "2 > 0 the
guilty might have an expected gain.
16H0 : ZT2 = ZT6 vs H1 : ZT2 < ZT6 (H3a)
H0 : ZT3 = ZT5 vs H1 : ZT3 > ZT5 (H3b)
A stronger adverse e￿ect of type-I errors on deterrence could be re￿ecting
either loss aversion or type-I error aversion. In order to disentangle the two
e￿ects, we compare the behavior of subjects in di￿erent sessions, exploiting
the di￿erences in the framing of the experimental task. Framing A, used in
sessions 1 and 2, describes punishment with a pronounced criminal frame.
It also o￿ers the initial endowment as a reference point and the two choices
produce either a loss (honesty) or a gain (crime). In this case, both loss
aversion and type-I error aversion may play a role. Framing B, used in
session 3, describes the sanction more neutrally, but still suggests a reference
point that shapes the two choices in terms of loss or gain. With this framing,
since we have neutralized type-I aversion, we should observe less pronounced
di￿erences between ZT2 and ZT6, and between ZT3 and ZT5, as compared
to framing A. We thus test whether "1 and "2 have the same e￿ect on
deterrence, while controlling for risk attitude and for type-I error aversion
by using a neutral framing. Framing C, used in session 4, describes the
choice without the criminal frame and without the loss frame. Controlling
for the e￿ect of risk aversion, type-I error aversion, and loss aversion, we test
whether crime increases in the same way in response to a given increase in
"1 or "2.
3.4 Procedures
The experiment was implemented in four sessions, with 24 subjects partic-
ipating in each session, for a total of 96 subjects. In each session, subjects
were randomly assigned to a computer terminal at their arrival. In order to
ensure public knowledge, instructions were distributed and read aloud (see
the Appendix). Sample questions were distributed to ensure understanding
of the experimental procedures. Answers were privately checked and, if nec-
essary, explained to the subjects, and the experiment did not start until all
subjects had answered all questions correctly.
Within each session, subjects were matched in pairs in each phase, as
described in Table 2, using a perfect stranger matching mechanism. Partic-
ipants were informed that each subject would play the role of player A, but
at the end of the experiment roles A and B would be randomly determined
within pairs, so that ex post each subject only played one role. The exper-
iment employed a no-feedback design, so that we could elicit the relevant
responses from all subjects and obtain statistically independent observations
across subjects. Subjects were paid on the basis of the outcome of one ran-
domly picked phase and one randomly selected role out of the two they had
played.
17The experiment was conducted in the Experimental Economics Labora-
tory of the University of Milan Bicocca in April 2009. Participants were
undergraduate students of Economics recruited by e-mail using a list of vol-
untary potential candidates. None of the subjects had participated previ-
ously in similar reverse dictator games. No show-up fee was paid. Payments
ranged between 0 and 20 euro, and the average payment was 11.1 euro for
sessions lasting on average approximately 45 minutes. The experiment was
run using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
4 Results
Figure 7 displays the percentage of criminals, by phase, in sessions 1 and 2. In
T1, where there is optimal deterrence in the absence of judicial errors ("1 =
"2 = 0), the percentage of criminals is 29 per cent. This ￿gure provides the
benchmark against which to assess the e￿ects of judicial errors on deterrence.
It is interesting to observe that the percentage of criminals is about 29 per
cent in both sessions, despite the sequence of treatments being reversed.
Similar results, irrespective of the sequence of treatments, are also obtained
for treatment T4 ("1 = "2 = 0:25): 75 and 79 per cent in sessions 1 and
2, respectively. This indicates that the order of treatments does not play a
major role.
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Table 3 displays the percentage of criminals in sessions 1 and 2, by treat-
ment, both overall and by subset of phases (3-6 and 7-10). The ￿gures indi-
cate that judicial errors have a large negative impact on deterrence. When
18both "1 and "2 are increased jointly to 0.25, the percentage of criminals rises
to 77.1 per cent. This e￿ect is strongly statistically signi￿cant, on the ba-
sis of a two-sided null hypothesis and 48 independent paired observations
(McNemar’s Â2
1 = 17.6, p-value = 0.00). The e￿ect is indeed stronger when,
keeping constant the expected gains from crime, judicial errors are increased
individually. In T2, where "2 is increased to 0.5, the percentage of criminals
rises to 81.2 per cent overall. In T3, where "1 is increased to 0.5, the average
percentage of criminals rises to 86.4 per cent overall. In both cases, focusing
on either phases 3-6 or 7-10, the e￿ect is strongly statistically signi￿cant.
These results indicate that judicial errors have a large and signi￿cant e￿ect
on crime deterrence. They also indicate that, for a given expected gain from
crime, the e￿ect is stronger when judicial errors are increased individually
rather than jointly.
Table 3: Percentage of criminals by treatment, sessions 1 and 2
T1 T4 T2 T3 T5 T6
Overall 29.2 77.1 81.2 86.4 81.2 77.1
Phases 3-6 85.4 83.3 77.1 72.9
Phases 7-10 77.1 89.6 85.4 81.2
Note: see Table 1 for a description of parameter calibration within treatments.
Result 1 - A higher probability of either type-I or type-II error
causes a large and signi￿cant increase in crime.
We now turn to hypothesis 2: Do type-I and type-II judicial errors have
the same impact on deterrence? We test this hypothesis by comparing the
average percentage of criminals in T2 and T3. Averaging across all phases,
there is a positive di￿erence of 5.2 percentage points between crime rates in
T3 and T2. Focusing on the last four phases, the di￿erence is much larger,
as the percentage of criminals is 77.1 and 89.6 per cent in T2 and T3, respec-
tively. For the relevant one-sided hypothesis, on the basis of 48 independent
paired observations, the di￿erence is strongly statistically signi￿cant (McNe-
mar’s Â2
1 = 3.6, p-value = 0.029). Contrary to the predictions of the standard
theory of crime deterrence, type-I and type-II errors do not have symmetric
e￿ects on crime deterrence.
Result 2 - The probability of type-I errors has a larger impact
on deterrence than the probability of type-II errors.
In order to assess the role played by risk attitudes in explaining the dif-
ferences in the e￿ects of type-I and type-II judicial errors on deterrence, we
vary the subjects’ endowments so as to obtain the same di￿erence in ex-
pected utility between honesty and crime in treatments T2 and T6 and T3
and T5, respectively. It is interesting to observe that the overall percentage
19of criminals falls from 86.4 in T3 (wA = 10) to 77.1 in T6 (wA = 20). This
e￿ect is statistically signi￿cant at the 5 per cent signi￿cance level both in
phases 3-6 and 7-10. The percentage of criminals is instead unchanged at
81.2 in T2 (wA = 10) and T5 (wA = 0) overall, but it rises from 77.1 in T2 to
85.4 in T5 when focusing on the last four phases, although this e￿ect is only
marginally signi￿cant (p-value = 0.10 for a two-sided hypothesis). Overall,
these results indicates that risk aversion plays a signi￿cant role for subjects’
decisions.
We therefore turn to comparing the e￿ects of type-I and type-II judicial
errors, while keeping constant the di￿erence in expected utility between crime
and honesty, so as to control for the e￿ects of risk attitudes. Overall, the
percentage of criminals is 77.1 in T6 ("1 = 0:5) and 81.2 in T2 ("2 = 0:5),
while 86.4 in T3 ("1 = 0:5) and 81.2 in T5 ("2 = 0:5). Focusing on the
last four phases, the di￿erence between T6 (81.2) and T2 (77.1) is positive,
but relatively small and not statistically signi￿cant (McNemar’s Â2
1 = 0.33, p-
value = 0.56). Similarly, the di￿erence in the percentage of criminals between
T3 and T5 is positive (4.2 percentage points) but small and not statistically
signi￿cant (McNemar’s Â2
1 = 1.00, p-value = 0.31). Overall, these results
indicate that, once we control for risk attitudes, the e￿ect of type-I errors on
deterrence is only marginally stronger than that of type-II errors, and the
di￿erence is no longer statistically signi￿cant.
Result 3 - Controlling for risk attitudes, the e￿ect of type-I
errors on deterrence is marginally stronger than the e￿ect of type-
II errors, but the di￿erence is not statistically signi￿cant.
Finally, we turn to assessing the role played by loss aversion and pro-
cedural fairness in explaining the asymmetric e￿ects of judicial errors on
deterrence. Figure 8 displays the percentage of criminals, by phase, in ses-
sions 3 and 4. Table 4 displays the corresponding ￿gures by treatment, both
overall and by subset of phases. The overall percentage of criminals in T2
rises from 81.1 in sessions 1-2 to 87.5 in session 3. On the contrary, in T3 it
falls from 86.4 in sessions 1-2 to 83.3 in session 3. As expected, whereas in
the presence of type-II errors the framing of the sanction as a punishment for
a theft has a positive e￿ect on crime deterrence, in the presence of type-I er-
rors the e￿ect of framing on deterrence is small and negative. These results,
albeit at a qualitative level, are consistent with the hypothesis of type-I error
aversion.
Focusing on the results for session 3, the larger e￿ect of "1 on deterrence,
relative to "2, virtually disappears when a neutral framing is used. The sign
of the di￿erence between the e￿ects of type-I and type-II errors, keeping
constant the di￿erence in expected utility between crime and honesty, is
indeed reversed. The overall percentage of criminals is 87.5 and 83.3 in T2
and T6, respectively, and 83.3 and 89.6 in T3 and T5, and these di￿erences
are not statistically signi￿cant. Focusing on the results for session 4, the
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overall percentage of criminals rises to 87.5, relative to 83.3 in session 3.
This positive e￿ect, although not statistically signi￿cant, is not consistent
with the theoretical predictions on the role of loss aversion for the e￿ects of
judicial errors.
Overall, although only at a qualitative level, the results for sessions 3 and
4 indicate that type-I error aversion ￿ a di￿erential sensitivity to procedu-
ral fairness for the two types of judicial errors ￿ may be playing a role in
explaining the asymmetric e￿ects of "1 and "2 on crime deterrence. On the
contrary, loss aversion does not seem to have a signi￿cant e￿ect.
Table 4: Percentage of criminals by treatment, sessions 3 and 4
T1 T4 T2 T3 T5 T6
Unframed (s3)
Overall 21.8 79.1 87.5 83.3 89.6 83.3
Phases 3-6 83.3 83.3 87.5 83.3
Phases 7-10 91.7 83.3 91.7 83.3
Unframed, no loss (s4)
Overall 4.1 70.8 79.1 87.5 85.4 87.5
Phases 3-6 83.3 83.3 83.3 79.1
Phases 7-10 75.0 91.7 87.5 95.8
Note: see Table 1 for a description of parameter calibration within treatments.
215 Conclusions
Judicial errors against innocent defendants represent an important issue not
only theoretically, but also empirically. Although no country produces o￿cial
statistics on judicial errors, there is some evidence produced by various na-
tional and international organizations.16 Gross et al. (2005) emphasize how
most relevant data sets are based on exoneration cases:17 their own data
base lists 340 exonerations in the US between 1989 and 2003. But counting
only the people that eventually obtain an o￿cial exoneration ￿ they argue
￿ may be only a glimpse of the ￿total number of miscarriages of justice in
America [that] in the last ￿fteen years must be in the thousands, perhaps
tens of thousands.￿
The ￿rst aim of this paper was to extend the economic theory of crime
deterrence to better account for the role type-I errors. In particular, the
paper cast light on the asymmetric e￿ects of the two types of judicial errors:
wrongful convictions were shown to be more detrimental to deterrence than
wrongful acquittals. We argued that both risk-aversion and loss-aversion
may contribute to produce this asymmetry. Moreover, we formulated the
hypothesis that an individual might be particularly averse to type-I errors,
because of the speci￿c e￿ect that wrongful convictions have on the expressive
function of the law.
The second aim of the paper was to provide an empirical test of the
predictions of our extended model using a laboratory experiment. The ex-
perimental design was based on a reverse dictator game, simulating a simple
crime such as petty larceny. We exogenously manipulated the probability
of type-I and type-II errors, and compared across treatments the propensity
of individuals to commit the crime. The ￿ndings are largely consistent with
our theoretical predictions. Both types of judicial errors have a large and
signi￿cant impact on deterrence. However, wrongful convictions are found
to have a stronger negative impact on deterrence than wrongful acquittals.
The analysis indicates that this result is largely explained by risk aversion.
We also ￿nd some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that type-I error
aversion may be playing a role in explaining the asymmetric e￿ects of type-I
and type-II judicial errors on deterrence.
It must be emphasized that, although in this paper the argument was
mainly framed in the context of criminal law, judicial errors can occur in
any adjudicative process. Our analysis can therefore be relevant for the
16Forejustice, for instance, provides a list of 2803 cases of innocents convicted (see also
Fon and Schaefer, 2007). This list envisages cases from 84 countries. In these 2803 cases,
184 people were executed, 514 people were sentenced to death, 575 people were sentenced to
life in prison. 2,622 people on this list were judicially exonerated or pardoned and 414 peo-
ple were exonerated after a false confession (187 in the US). (http://www.forejustice.org,
accessed on July, 16th 2009).
17Cases for which people have been ￿rst convicted (and the conviction reached the ￿nal
stage often including the court of last resort), and then, after some time, declared innocent
because some new evidence has emerged.
22decisions taken by organizations as diverse as administrative agencies, com-
mercial trade associations, religious bodies, professional sports leagues and
the like.18
Overall, the behavioral implications of the deterrence hypothesis pose
important challenges to the economic theory of the public enforcement of
law. Type-I errors may jeopardize deterrence more than it has been so far
predicted in the literature. This makes a strong economic case for the public
authority to place particular emphasis on type-I errors, since the economic
goal of public law enforcement is to achieve optimal deterrence.
The results presented in this paper also have important implications for
the law and economics literature. In particular, they help the standard model
of optimal crime deterrence to make sense of the pro-defendant bias observed
in the criminal procedures of modern democracies. More generally, they
contribute to explain the common wisdom that the conviction of an innocent
should be considered far worse than the acquittal of a guilty individual.
18Consider, for instance, the case of tax audit, an adjudicative process that is often
prone to type-I errors, not least because tax agencies pursue con￿icting interests. Tax
audit errors are notoriously numerous in some countries.
23Appendix - Instructions
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. During the ex-
periment you are not allowed to talk or communicate in any way with other
participants. If at any time you have any questions raise your hand and one
of the assistants will come to you to answer it. By following the instructions
carefully you can earn an amount of money that will depend on your choices
and the choices of other participants. At the end of the experiment, the
resulting amount will be paid to you in cash.
General rules
² There are 24 subjects participating in this experiment.
² The experiment takes place in 10 independent phases. Instructions for
each phase will appear on the screen.
² In each phase, 12 couples of two participants will be formed randomly
and anonymously, so that in each phase you will interact with a di￿erent
subject.
² Within each couple, the two subjects will be randomly assigned two
di￿erent roles: A and B.
² Therefore, in each phase each subject will interact exclusively with the
other subject in her pair, without knowing her/her identity, with the
role (A or B) assigned with equal probability.
² The choices that you and the other subject will make in each and
the corresponding outcomes will be communicated at the end of the
experiment.
² At the end of the experiment only one of the 10 phases will be selected
randomly and earnings for each participant will be determined on the
basis of the selected phase.
How earnings are determined within each phase
² Your choice consists in deciding whether to steal 10 euro to the subject
you have been paired with.
² You will have a known endowment of x euro, whereas the other subject
will have an endowment of y euro (unknown to you).
² After you have made your choice, there will be a check in order to
punish those who steal.
² The check will be subject to a certain error, as follows:
24￿ If you have stolen 10 euro to the other subject, you will have to
pay a 10 euro ￿ne with a probability of p.
￿ If you have not stolen 10 euro to the other subject, you will have
to pay a 10 euro ￿ne with a probability of q.
² Therefore, within each phase, earnings will be determined as follows:
￿ If you decide to steal, the other subject will earn y ¡10 euro and
you will earn:
x euro with probability p
x + 10 euro with probability 1 ¡ p
￿ If you decide not to steal, the other subject will earn y euro and
you will earn:
x ¡ 10 euro with probability q
x euro with probability 1 ¡ q
How ￿nal earnings are determined
² At the end of the experiment only one of the 10 phases will be selected
randomly and the earnings for each participant will be determined on
the basis of the selected phase.
² Within each phase each subject will have both an active role and a
passive role. At the end of the experiment the earnings of each subject




In order to illustrate the di￿erences in the formulation of instructions
among the sessions, we report below the description of T4 under each framing:
Sessions 1 and 2 (Crime Framing with Loss). In this phase you have
an initial endowment of 10 euro. If you steal 10 euro from the other subject,
you have to pay a ￿ne of 10 euro with probability 75%. Therefore, if you
steal, you will gain all in all i) 10 euro with probability 75% and ii) 20 euro
with probability 20%.
If you do not steal 10 euro from the other subject, you have to pay a
￿ne of 10 euro with probability 20%. Therefore if you do not steal, you will
gain all in all i)5 euro with probability 20% and ii)10 euro with probability
75%.
Choice: do you want to steal 10 euro from the other subject?
25Session 3 (Neutral Framing with Loss). In this phase you have an
initial endowment of 10 euro. If you steal 10 euro from the other subject,
you loose 10 euro from the bet with probability 75%. Therefore, if you steal,
you will gain all in all i) 10 euro with probability 75% and ii) 20 euro with
probability 20%.
If you do not steal 10 euro from the other subject, you loose 10 euro
from the bet with probability 20%. Therefore if you do not steal, you will
gain all in all i)5 euro with probability 20% and ii)10 euro with probability
75%.
Choice: do you want to steal 10 euro from the other subject?
Session 4 (Neutral Framing with no Loss) . In this phase you have
an initial endowment of 0 euro. If you steal 10 euro from the other subject,
you have to pay a ￿ne of 10 euro with probability 75%. Therefore, if you
steal, you will gain all in all i) 10 euro with probability 75% and ii) 20 euro
with probability 20%.
If you do not steal 10 euro from the other subject, you have to pay a
￿ne of 10 euro with probability 20%. Therefore if you do not steal, you will
gain all in all i)5 euro with probability 20% and ii)10 euro with probability
75%.
Choice: do you want to steal 10 euro from the other subject?
26References
Abbink, K., ￿Laboratory experiments on corruption,￿ The Handbook of
Corruption, 2006.
Backes-Gellner, U., D. Bessey, K. Pull, and S.N. Tuor, ￿What Be-
havioural economics teaches personnel economics,￿ Institute for Strategy
and Business Economics University of Zurich, 2008.
Becker, Gary, ￿Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,￿ Journal
of Political Economy, 1968, 76, 169￿217.
Block, Michael K. and Joseph Gregory Sidak, ￿The Cost of Antitrust
Deterrence: Why not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?,￿ Georgetown
Law Journal, 1980, 68 (5), 1131￿1139.
Bowles, Samuel, Microeconomics: behavior, institutions, and evolution,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Cooter, Robert, ￿Expressive Law and Economics,￿ The Journal of Legal
Studies, 1998, 27 (2, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic
Analysis of Law), 585￿608.
Craswell, R. and J.E. Calfee, ￿Deterrence and uncertain legal standards,￿
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1986, 2 (2), 279￿303.
Demougin, Dominique and Claude Fluet, ￿Deterrence versus Judicial
Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof,￿ Journal of Institu-
tional and Theoretical Economics, 2005, 161 (2), 193￿206.
Ehrlich, Isaac, ￿The Optimum Enforcement of Laws and the Concept of
Justice: A Positive Analysis,￿ International Review of Law and Economics,
1982, 2, 3￿27.
Ellickson, R. C., Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Har-
vard University Press, 1991.
Falk, A and U Fischbacher, ￿"Crime" in the lab-detecting social interac-
tion,￿ European Economic Review, 2002, 46, 859￿869.
Falk, Armin and Simon G￿chter, ￿experimental Labour Economics,￿
in Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, eds., The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Fehr, E. and S. Gachter, ￿Cooperation and punishment in public goods
experiments,￿ American Economic Review, 2000, 90 (4), 980￿994.
27Feinberg, William E., ￿Teaching the Type I and Type II Errors: The
Judicial Process,￿ The American Statistician, 1971, 25 (3).
Fon, V. and H.B. Schaefer, ￿State Liability for Wrongful Conviction:
Incentive E￿ects on Crime Levels,￿ Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics, 2007, 163 (2), 269￿284.
Galbiati, Roberto and Pietro Vertova, ￿Obligations and cooperative
behaviour in public good games,￿ Games and Economic Behavior, 2008,
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.004.
Garoupa, Nuno, ￿The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement,￿ Journal of
Economic Surveys, 1997, 11 (3), 267￿295.
and Matteo Rizzolli, ￿Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence,￿
mimeo, 2009.
Gross, Samuel R., Kristen Jacoby, Daniel J. Matheson, Nicholas
Montgomery, and Sujata Patil, ￿Exonerations in the United States
1989 through 2003,￿ The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 2005,
95 (2), 523￿560.
Harris, J.R., ￿On the Economics of Law and Order,￿ Journal of Political
Economy, 1970, 78 (1), 165.
Harrison, J., ￿Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law
and Economics,￿ UCLA Law Review, 1986, 33 (5), 1309￿1354.
Hoerisch, Hannah and Christina Strassmair, ￿An experimental test
of the deterrence hypothesis,￿ University of Munich, Department of Eco-
nomics Discussion papers Series, 2008, 04-08.
Immordino, Giovanni and Michele Polo, ￿Judicial Errors and Innovative
Activity,￿ IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research)
Working paper, 2008, (337).
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky, ￿Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Deci-
sion under Risk,￿ Econometrica, 1979, 47 (2), 263￿292.
Kahneman, Daniel, ￿Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Be-
havioral Economics,￿ The American Economic Review, 2003, 93 (5), 1449￿
1475.
, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, ￿Experimental Tests of the
Endowment E￿ect and the Coase Theorem,￿ Journal of Political Economy,
1990, 98 (6), 1325￿1348.
, , and , ￿The Endowment E￿ect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias:
Anomalies,￿ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991, 5 (1), 193￿206.
28Kaplow, L., ￿Accuracy in Adjudication,￿ in ￿The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics and the Law’,￿ Harvard Law School, 1996.
Kaplow, Louis, ￿The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic
Analysis,￿ Journal of Legal Studies, 1994, 23 (1), 307￿401.
Kaplow, Luis and Steven Shavell, ￿Accuracy in the Determination of
Liability,￿ Journal of Law and Economics, 1994, 37 (1), 1￿15.
K￿bberling, V. and P.P. Wakker, ￿An index of loss aversion,￿ Journal
of Economic Theory, 2005, 122 (1), 119￿131.
Lando, Henrik, ￿Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?,￿ Journal
of Legal Studies, 2006, 35 (2), 327￿338.
Nance, D. A., ￿Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of
the Cathedral,￿ Virginia Law Review, 1997, 83 (5), 837￿937.
Png, Ivan P. L., ￿Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Ju-
dicial Error,￿ International Review of Law and Economics, 1986, 6 (1),
101￿05.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell, ￿The Theory of Public En-
forcement of Law,￿ in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds., Hand-
book of Law and economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.
Polinsky, A.M. and S. Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, 2nd ed., Vol.
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.
Rabin, M and RH Thaler, ￿Risk Aversion,￿ Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 2001.
Rabin, Matthew, ￿Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibra-
tion Theorem,￿ Econometrica, 2000, pp. 1281￿1292.
Schmidt, U and H Zank, ￿What is Loss Aversion?,￿ Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 2005.
Schulze, G.G. and B. Frank, ￿Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation:
Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility,￿ Economics
of Governance, 2003, 4 (2), 143￿160.
Sonnemans, Joep and Frans van Dijk, ￿Errors in Judicial Deci-
sions,￿ Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-089/1, Tinbergen Insti-
tute September 2008.
Strandburg, Katherine, ￿Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents,￿
Connecticut Law Review, 2003, 35, 1321￿1350.
29Torgler, Benno, ￿Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax
Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments,￿ Journal of Economic Sur-
veys, 2002, 16 (5), 657￿683.
Visser, M.S., W.T. Harbaugh, and N.H. Mocan, ￿An Experimental
Test of Criminal Behavior Among Juveniles and Young Adults,￿ National
Bureau of Economic Research Working paper 12507, 2006.
30